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INTRODUCTION 
Explaining when and why performance differences persist is an important topic in 
strategy and management (McGahan & Porter, 1997; Nag, Hambrick, & Chen, 2007; Rumelt, 
1991; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). Prior studies typically attribute performance differences 
among firms to three factors: the industry, corporate and firm effects and there is an on-going 
debate about how much each of these factors explains (see, Vanneste, 2017 for a meta-analysis). 
However, a common but often overlooked feature among these studies is that the total variances 
explained by these three factors together rarely exceeds 50%. Even after adjustments for sample 
size and variance decompsition techniques, on average there are still 45% unexplained variances 
for why performances differ (Vanneste, 2017). The implication is that unexplained variance, or 
simply chance, deserves a more central role in studying performance differences and their 
persistence in management. 
Many management scholars have proposed that chance is an important alternative 
explanation for performance differences (Alchian, 1950; Aldrich, 1979; Arthur, 1989; Barney, 
1986; Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972; Denrell, 2004; Hannan & Freeman, 1989; Levinthal, 1991; 
Lippman & Rumelt, 1982; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Porter, 1991; Starbuck, 1994). But 
empirically this alternative explanation has not yet been taken seriously. We argue that 
management researchers could learn from other fields such as physics (Ruhla & Ruhia, 1992), 
genetics (Kimura, 1984) and ecology (Hubbell, 2001) where chance plays a central role in 
explaining observed differences (for a review, see Denrell et al., 2015). For example, 
management researchers can develop more rigorous theories when their empirical results are 
strong enough to reject the null hypotheses from “chance models” where observed performances 
are assumed to be the product of chance operating in structured environments (Schwab, 
Abrahamson, Starbuck, & Fidler, 2011; Starbuck, 1994). 
Here we employ the idea of chance models to examine when and why performance 
differences persist in six datasets from professional sports and firm performances: National 
Football League (NFL, 2001-2016), National Basketball Association (NBA, 2004-2017); Major 
League Baseball (MLB, 1901-2016), Formula One Racing (F1, 1996-2015), return on assets of 
US firms (ROA, 1980-2010) and Fortune500 firms (1955-2005).  
To address the “when” question, we draw on a simple chance model where performances 
are assumed to be a product of the more stable, dispositional factors (e.g., leaders’ traits, firms’ 
  
routines, corporate structure) and the more changeable, situational factors (e.g., uncontrollable 
circumstances, coincidence). Such a model implies “regression to the mean”: more extreme 
performances tend to be followed by less extreme performances (Galton, 1886). For example, 
taller fathers tend to have shorter sons. The intuition is that the more extreme performances (e.g., 
heights) indicate stronger influence from dispositional factors (e.g., inherited genes) but also 
stronger influence from situational factors (e.g., random mutations). Since the situational factors 
are changeable and unlikely to persist, one should not expect the future performance to continue 
being so extreme. Hence, taller fathers tend to have, on average, shorter sons.  This statistical 
account of performance (im)persistence also predicts that the effects of regressions would be 
stronger when the role of chance plays a more important role in performances.  
Our results support our predictions: we found robust regression to the mean effects in all 
datasets examined and the effects are stronger when the performance is more unreliable, i.e., 
chance matters more in outcomes. Moreover, the regression effects can be so strong that they 
generate non-monotonic performance associations. For example, we show that top performing 
firms at year t (in terms of ROA, >95th percentile) tend to have a lower expected rank at year t+1 
than the “second best” at year t (i.e., 90th to 95th percentile). This rank reversal goes beyond 
conventional understanding of regression to the mean (cf. Harrison & March, 1984; Strang & 
Macy, 2001) and we will discuss its implication for learning and competition.  
We also addressed the “why” question about performance persistence. We found strong 
effects of regression to the mean but they do not always produce non-monotonic performance 
associations. Even when they did, the locations of the non-monotonic kinks vary. We developed 
chance models to computationally examine how specific contextual factors, combined with 
chance, can produce results that are consistent with our empirical findings. These “chance 
explanations” provide stronger null hypotheses when testing alternative theoretical predictions 
than current practices (Schwab et al., 2011; Starbuck, 1994). For example, performance feedback 
theory suggests that top performing firms tend to decline because complacency-triggered risk 
aversion (Greve, 2003) or superstitious learning and inertia from prior successes (Audia, Locke, 
& Smith, 2000). Our chance models suggest that these interesting, causal effects may exist but 
exaggerated when researchers did not take into account the dull, statistical effects of regression 
to the mean, particularly for the “outliers” whose performances regress downward the most. The 
implication is that chance models are not contradictory but complementary to current practices 
when developing more rigorous management theories.  
Our intended contribution is threefold. First, we provide a new way of examining 
performance persistence by borrowing ideas from natural sciences. Chance models emphasize 
the impacts of unsystematic variances that management researchers usually consider nuisance to 
be eliminated in their explanations. Our results echo a widely shared belief in natural sciences 
that chance in structured environment can produce systematic patterns (Bak, 1997; Newman, 
Barabasi, & Watts, 2006; Sober, 1993). Our findings also illustrate how chance models can in 
fact strengthen the quality of theoretical development in management. Brushing off chance 
explanations can lead to overestimation of systematic factors. Chance models deserve more 
attention from management researchers and we illustrate two of the many possible ways of 
developing and utilizing them.   
  
Second, we show that the effects of regression to the mean are prevalent in various 
contexts but their effects are idiosyncratic. The effects can be so strong in certain performance 
ranges that they generate non-monotonic performance associations and rank reversals. In 
particular, top performing firms seem to be increasingly sensitive to regression to the mean - we 
show a decreasing persistence among top performing firms in the past thirty years based on ROA 
and Fortunte500 firms data. This suggests that the main mechanism that produces exceptional 
performances is increasingly likely to be factors beyond managers’ control. Some firms could get 
lucky in one year but most of these “outliers” soon fail to beat the effects of regression to the 
mean (cf. Peters & Waterman, 1982). Managers who ignore these findings and instead believe 
that firms can be “built to last” or move from “good to great” by design are to commit illusion of 
control. We developed several chance models to replicate these non-monotonic performance 
associations we found and we hope future researchers could build on our ideas and develop more 
thoughtful chance models to further explore when and how regression to the mean occurs.  
Third, the non-monotonic performance associations and the implied rank reversals have 
important implications for searching for strategic opportunities. People tend to believe that 
higher performances indicate higher skill, romanticize these exceptional performers and expect 
their performances to persist, ignoring the effects of regression to the mean (Dawes, 1979; 
Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Meindl, Ehrlich, & Dukerich, 1985). Our 
findings are against laypersons’ intuition and may imply collective false expectations and 
misevaluations, particularly around the ranges where performance non-monotonicity occurs. 
This may be bad news because systematic over- and under-estimations are likely. But this can 
mean good news to “strategic arbitragers” who are ready to exploit others’ predictable mistakes 
(Liu, 2017; Zuckerman, 2012).  
In particular, we show how the non-monotonic patterns we found can be translated into 
profits using data from sport betting and discuss when they imply strategic opportunities beyond 
sport. People tend to believe that higher performances indicate higher skill and higher future 
performance. The non-monotonic performance associations identified suggest a counterintuitive 
result that people may not comprehend or resist to accommodate. This implies a possible 
arbitrage opportunity: strategic arbitragers can buy low (e.g., acquiring extremely poor 
performing actors or resources because they are likely under-estimated by others) and sell high 
(e.g., releasing exceptionally performing actors or resources because they are likely over-
estimated by others). But there is often a “limit to arbitrage” (Benner & Zenger, 2016; Litov, 
Moreton, & Zenger, 2012; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) – one cannot profit from having unique 
insights if one’s strategy or performance depend on stakeholders who are likely to mistake luck 
for skill when evaluating the outliers. In other words, social constraint can make the 
inefficiencies in evaluations to persist, e.g., lucky but incompetent executives continue to receive 
huge bonus even when their performances become systematically worse than their currently 
lower performing counterpart, i.e., the second best.  
The limits to arbitrage due to interactive social dynamics may be weaker in some 
contexts. For example, the non-monotonic associations we identified in NFL and MLB may 
entail profitable arbitrage opportunities because bookmakers and sport gamblers may not yet 
incorporate fully the regression effects, and particularly the non-monotonic performance 
associations. This implies that the odds for the exceptionally performing teams may be overly 
favorable whereas the odds for the extremely poor performing teams may be overly unfavorable. 
  
More importantly, limits to arbitrage are much weaker in this case, as long as one has sufficient 
funding to develop an investment portfolio that utilizes the non-monotonic performance 
association identified.  
To examine this prediction, we downloaded the historical odd data from 
www.oddsportal.com. We then identified the highest and lowest performing teams in NFL, 
where performance non-monotonicity is most significant. We then simulated various investment 
portfolios based on bets on the salient winners’ future season games to lose and on the salient 
losers’ future season games to win. The idea is to exploit bookmakers’ underestimation of salient 
losers and the overestimation of salient winners. The simulation results show that the investment 
portfolios have a positive return when the bet focuses only on the first game in the next season. 
This is not surprising in hindsight – bookmakers adjusted their odds based on the observed 
performances during a season so the odds become increasingly reliable and reflect the actual 
quality of the team (against its component) over time. However, information about team quality 
is more ambiguous before the first game of a season and hence it is influenced more by last 
season’s outcomes, making the arbitrage opportunities most likely to exist. Interestingly, this 
arbitrage strategy works better for betting on salient losers’ first season game to win. The reason 
is not because these underdogs are more likely to win, but because the odd is more favourable 
(e.g., 10/1 if this last season’s loser wins this first game) than a similar strategy that focuses on 
the salient winners (e.g., 3/1 if this last season’s winner loses this first game). Stated differently, 
strategic arbitrages work more effectively for the underdogs than the stars because the degree of 
underestimation is greater than the degree of overestimation. One possible explanation is about 
the asymmetrical attention people pay to the winners versus the losers (Pontikes & Barnett, 
2017):  winners attract more attention and scrutiny so their odds can be overestimated but not as 
much as the degree of the underestimation against the losers. Overall this exercise shows that our 
theory is not merely an abstract possibility but can be translated into a behavioral insight and an 
alternative source of superior profit (Fang & Liu, Forthcoming).   
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